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Bringing the Citizen Back In: 






While, in theory, decentralisation offers many benefits – increased efficiency and 
effectiveness of public service provision, reduced horizontal inequalities, and an associated 
consolidation of the social contract between states and their citizens, empirical evidence of 
these benefits remains limited.  Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Burundi in 2011, this 
paper argues that the current donor emphasis on institution building alone as a support to the 
Burundian process proves insufficient.  Evidence is presented to show that current support, 
while consolidating the authority of local political elites, reinforces political and horizontal 
inequalities thereby paving the way for further disaffection and conflict.  Reflecting back to 
the initial aims of the process, a re-orientation in support is proposed, moving the focus 
beyond elite state actors and institutions and bringing citizens back into the process of state 
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1.  Introduction 
Widespread international support for decentralised governance since the late 1980s has 
resulted in its adoption in over 80 per cent of developing countries to date (Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008).  The advantages are, from a public administration perspective, increased 
efficiency and effectiveness of public service provision through increased responsiveness, 
flexibility and innovativeness in responding to local demands, reduced corruption and overall 
enhanced service delivery.  From a political perspective, advantages seen to lie in increasing 
state legitimacy, stability and support, together with democracy more broadly.  (Crook, 2003; 
Smoke, 2003; Devas and Delay, 2006). 
  
More recently, as the interconnections between security and development studies become 
more pronounced, decentralisation has come to be seen as an increasingly important part of 
conflict resolution and/or conflict mitigation strategies within fragile states (Cammack et al, 
2006; DfID, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2007, 2011; World Bank, 2011).   It has also been argued that 
decentralisation can increase social capital across local societies, enhancing the social 
contract between citizens and the state (Brinkerhoff, 2011).  Contributions at this level often 
highlight the key inter-related elements of downward accountability and citizen participation 
in decentralised structures and processes. 
  
Much of these normative attributes are premised on two assumptions however.  First, that 
public officials work for the common good and, therefore, that downward accountability will 
be relatively unproblematic, and second, that an appetite for citizen participation (among 
public officials and citizens alike) exists.  Yet decentralised institutions and practices are 
often introduced into neo-patrimonial contexts characterised by client-patron relations where 
the danger of elite capture is high (Cammack et al, 2006; Chanie, 2007; UNDP, 
2009).  Indeed, research findings reveal that the jury is still out on the effectiveness or 
otherwise of decentralisation experiments, policies and programmes to date.  A number of 
studies reveal that decentralised governance does not necessarily lead to improved services 
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(Conyers, 2007; Booth, 2010) and that it can lead to increased corruption (Treisman, 2000). 
Moreover, focusing particularly on post-conflict situations, a number of large N-studies show 
that decentralisation can lead to increased conflict (Lake and Rothchild, 2005; Schou and 
Haug, 2005; Siegle and O’Mahoney, 2008) while others (Ogbahara, 2008; Trócaire, 2008; 
Gubser, 2011) argue that decentralisation fails when it ignores both the history of state 
formation and existing forms of governance and politics. 
  
The question therefore of interest to policy makers and programme implementers is what 
form of support to decentralisation is most appropriate and effective in a given context.  This 
question is addressed here in the context of Burundi’s decentralisation programme.  Adopting 
a historicised, political economy approach and drawing on fieldwork conducted at both 
national level and within eight communes distributed across five of Burundi’s seventeen 
provinces[1], the paper highlights a fundamental tension between the normative objectives of 
international support – building institutions which are accountable and responsive to citizens, 
and the practice – building political authority among a narrow group of local elites thereby 
consolidating traditional power relations and reinforcing horizontal inequalities.  Arguing that 
both the national and international community need to contribute toward the rebuilding of 
politics and not just institutions, a re-orientation in support is proposed, moving the focus 
beyond elite state actors and institutions and bringing citizens back into the process of state 
building and transformation.  
  
This argument is developed as follows.  The following section provides a brief account of 
Burundi’s political history, providing an overview of the context into which decentralisation 
was introduced following the peace accord signed in Arusha in 2000 and focusing on the key 
drivers of conflict up to and following this time.  This account highlights the neo-patrimonial 
nature of social and political life in Burundi and the central role played by political elites in 
both past and current conflicts.  The principle steps in developing and consolidating the 
policy and institutions of decentralisation are then outlined in the third section where it is 
seen that while the country’s decentralisation policy may be regarded as far-reaching – 
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advocating deep and broad-based political reform – international and national support in its 
implementation remains largely restricted to institution building in the form of capacity 
building among narrow groups of political elites.  Examining the implications of this support 
for decentralisation on the ground, section four turns to findings regarding the actions and 
motivations of local state officials and reveals that, intensive capacity building measures 
notwithstanding, upward accountability remains the norm with political promotion and 
advancement the key motivations at commune level while traditional hierarchies dominate at 
more local levels also.  The fifth section, examining citizen engagement and participation in 
local structures, reveals low levels of participation and goes on to explain this policy-practice 
gap as emanating from a widespread public distaste for political engagement rooted in state-
sponsored intimidation and violence.  The findings highlight the importance of history and 
politics and form the basis for the proposed re-orientation in support to the process.  The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings more broadly. 
  
2. Burundi – the political context 
Since attaining independence in 1962, Burundi has been plagued by internal conflict and 
violence, most recently a civil war which, breaking out in 1993, lasted over ten 
years.  Involving widespread human rights violations, political manipulation and 
intimidation, this has resulted in the social, economic and political exclusion of wide swathes 
of the country’s population. 
 
A peace agreement signed in 2000 was followed by new constitution in 2005 and, with one 
rebel movement (FNL-Palipehutu) continuing to fight, elections were held in 2005 leading to 
a new power-sharing executive with both ethnic[2] and gender-based[3] quotas.  As we see in 
the following section, this constitution included provisions for decentralised governance at 
both commune and hill level[4].  While there was hope and stability for a short time, the 2010 
elections were marred by intimidation and violence by all contesting parties (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009, 2010; Sentamba, 2010; Vandeginste, 2011).  At the time of writing, unrest 
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continues, with ongoing reports of political intimidation, repression and extra-judicial 
political assassinations. 
  
While, in the shadow of its neighbour Rwanda, there is a popular tendency to attribute this 
conflict to ethnic grievances[5], more systematic analyses within the literature argue that that 
the causes of Burundi’s conflict are more complex than ethnic grievances alone (Hammouda, 
1995; Lemarchand, 2006; Ndikumana, 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; Reyntjens, 
2005; Uvin, 2008, 2009, 2010).   For these analysts, the roots and ongoing drivers of conflict 
lie in the state apparatus itself – both the “predatory bureaucracy which cares only for its 
own interests” (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 370) and the struggles for resources among 
and across different groups of the political elite.  Peter Uvin expresses this succinctly… 
This system is at the core of Burundi’s problems. It is an institutionalized system of 
corruption, social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack of accountability 
and clientelism. It has gorged itself for decades on aid money. Every Burundian 
knows this system, in which small groups of people use the state to advance their 
personal interests. It is the key problem and the main cause of war, not ethnicity or 
poverty. 
                                                                                                            (Uvin, 2008: 109-110) 
This system both relies on and has resulted in a citizenry which is easily manipulated for 
support for different political leaderships, either through poverty or through 
intimidation.  Where people are poor, they may be more easily bought. Where they are 
fearful, they are more easily intimidated.  The degree to which such manipulation is a feature 
of social life in Burundi is borne out by the findings of a survey of 400 people nationwide 
conducted in 2010 which, inter alia, reveal that 29 per cent of respondents feel it is 
acceptable to either be paid for or receive favours for political support, 22 per cent feel 
obliged, when asked, to join local “groupe de jeunes” – armed militia groups, and 9 per cent 
feel people who vote for the ‘wrong’ party should be excluded from access to basic social 
services thereafter (La Bénévolencjia/SFCG, 2011: 67). 
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Thus, the principal drivers of Burundi’s past and ongoing conflicts appear to be two-fold – a 
predatory, neo-patrimonial state giving rise to an institutionalised system of corruption and 
manipulation, and a fearful, marginalised and intimidated population struggling to survive 
within this.  The key to peace and stability therefore appears to lie in reform – or indeed a 
wholescale transformation – of the system, reducing the systematic exclusion and 
exploitation of vast swathes of the country’s population and promoting greater equality – in 
access to resources, services and opportunities - across society broadly rather than just for the 
elite few.  The critical question is where the demand for such transformation can come 
from.  In a system benefiting the select few a lot of the time, many some of the time, and the 
majority none of the time, it can only come from those marginalised citizens who have been 
systematically exploited and excluded from social and political life.  The recently introduced 
system of decentralised governance which affords a central place to citizens within this 
system appears to present a real opportunity for such reform.  It is in this context that the 
present research was carried out.  
  
3.  (Re)Introducing decentralisation 
Although introduced in its current form in 2005, decentralisation is not new to Burundi, 
having been first introduced during the colonial period in 1959.  As the Burundian political 
scientist Sentamba (2011: 4) has written, the experience was not positive with “commune 
councillors and burgomasters/administrators acting like the chiefs and sub-chiefs of long 
ago, notably depleting communal resources”[6].  Sentamba describes the system of 
decentralisation from the 1960s forward as serving as a system of political and social control, 
with authority exercised in a rigidly hierarchical top-down manner, with accountability 
running upward to the Provincial Governor and central administration[7].  It was into this 
context that the current decentralised structures were introduced.  First introduced during the 
peace negotiations in Arusha, a new form of decentralisation was written into the new 
Constitution of March 18th, 2005.  A Local Government Law was adopted that same year and 
commune levels elections were held in 2005 with the first hill level elections taking place in 
2010[8]. 
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3.1  Decentralisation in theory: current policy and procedures 
The publication of a comprehensive policy on decentralisation in 2009 represented a 
significant milestone in the evolution of the process as it was here that the broad principles 
and objectives of the process were set out.  Recalling the spirit of the peace negotiations in 
which decentralisation was first mooted, the policy emphasises the political nature of the 
process and its role in state building more broadly. 
... the actors of the Arusha Accord, departing from the position that deficits 
in governance formed the essential basis of the successive crises that the country has 
suffered, pronounced themselves in favour of an effective Decentralisation within the 
country.  A Decentralisation wherein the principle challenges are the introduction of 
a democracy at the base, and the promotion of participative and sustainable socio-
economic development. 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 10) 
  
Two key aspects in particular stand out within this policy, reflecting those within 
decentralisation policies more broadly.  The first is the shift from upward to downward 
accountability, while the second is the move toward active citizen participation within local 
structures and processes.  The radical change in political culture required in bringing about 
such change is described within the policy as necessitating nothing less than a “silent 
revolution”.  
[Decentralisation] favours a ‘silent revolution’ which brings about a qualitative 
change in society. Decentralisation demands a new state culture, a new politico-
administrative spirit within the state… Everybody, not just locally elected leaders as 
we all are inclined to think, is an actor within Decentralisation. 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 56) 
  
And so, in a radical break with the past, citizens now have a role to play in both determining 
development priorities and overseeing initiatives to address these priorities. This is 
emphasised repeatedly within the policy. 
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…Decentralisation aims at the active participation of all the population in defining 
and implementing economic and social development policies in their localities.  The 
envisaged outcomes from a process of Decentralisation are, on the one hand, local 
and community development and, on the other, local democracy and good 
governance. 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 10) 
  
Elsewhere, it is noted that citizen participation goes beyond merely consulting local citizens 
on their views and ideas to their involvement with state officials in shared decision-making. 
The Government of the Republic of Burundi has taken the political option of bringing 
public services closer to the people and of involving the people in decision-making 
and choice in relation to development programmes and projects in their localities. 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 61) 
  
These broad aims and objectives find more concrete expression in a number of texts 
developed with the support of the European Union’s Gutwara Neza programme[9] (notably 
the Local Government Law and the Manual of Administrative and Financial Procedures 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2005, 2011)) which set out the role and operational procedures 
of both commune and hill councils.  While the role of the commune council is to ensure that 
public services respond to the needs of the population (Article 5[10]), the role of the hill 
council is four-fold - to propose to the commune councils actions leading to development and 
the preservation of peace; to mediate / arbitrate on conflicts between neighbours; to advise 
the commune council on possible projects for the hills; and to monitor the implementation of 
commune activities on the hills (Article 16).  
  
A range of provisions for downward accountability and active citizen participation are set out 
for both structures.  At commune level, council meetings, held three times a year, are open to 
the public and minutes and decisions reached are posted on the notice board outside the 
commune offices (Articles 10, 19 and Gouvernement de Burundi, 2011: 15).  In addition, the 
annual progress report prepared by the Administrator is made publicly available following 
validation by the commune council (Article 31) and, twice a year, the commune council holds 
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public information sessions with hill council members and members of local associations 
wherein participants may pose questions and propose ideas to commune council members 
(Article 15).  At hill level, the head of the hill council organises a public meeting for all hill 
residents at least three times a year to collectively analyse local issues (Article 37). 
  
Following these policies and procedures therefore, the decentralisation process in Burundi 
offers numerous opportunities for downward accountability and citizen oversight and 
participation. 
  
3.2  International and national support to the process 
As we have seen above, these new structures and procedures require radical shifts in political 
culture and relations – for state officials they require a move from upward to downward 
accountability and, for people in general, a move from being passive subjects of the state to 
active citizens.  To assist in this transformation, a number of supports have been offered by 
international agencies – often working through local non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).  With a low level of capacity among decentralised state officials consistently 
highlighted by a number of commentators (Sentamba, 2005; OAG, 2007, 2010; ABELO, 
2009), this support has taken the form of capacity building workshops for local officials and 
select numbers of citizens.  These have been designed and delivered by both international 
agencies[11] and local NGOs.  
  
Administrators and local officials interviewed for this research reported that they participate 
in, on average, two workshops of between three and five days a month.  This amounts to 
between a third and a half of officials’ total working hours and is certainly significant.  In 
addition to this, a number of technical manuals on financial and administrative procedures 
have been produced by the Gutwara Neza programme.  These have been distributed 
throughout the country with training provided in their use[12].  A recent comprehensive 
evaluation on training carried out (Baltissan and Sentamba, 2011) finds little or no 
11 | P a g e  
 
coordination of this training across the country however and is strongly critical of the top-
down pedagogical style which serves to reinforce local hierarchies rather than transform 
them.  Questions are also raised in relation to the criteria used for citizen selection with the 
researchers suggesting that per diems and political loyalties play a more significant role in 
this selection process than the criteria set out by workshop sponsors.  Thus, it appears that 
these capacity building workshops reinforce rather than transform traditional power relations 
and hierarchies with neo-patrimonial relations also appearing to dictate their citizen selection 
procedures.  The following two sections go on to examine if this is indeed the case. 
  
4.  Decentralisation in practice: State engagement 
Having examined both the legal and policy context and the nature of supports currently 
provided to the process, the following two sections set out to explore how this is translated 
into practice on the ground.  This section focuses on state engagement with the process while 
the following section focuses on citizen engagement. 
  
4.1    Requirements for Decentralisation 
Scholars and analysts of decentralisation highlight four fundamental requirements for 
decentralisation to work in practice – a clear and unambiguous separation of powers between 
local and national levels; a transfer of resources from the national to the local; downward 
accountability from local state officials to local citizens; and active citizen participation in 
planning and implementation at local level (Smoke, 2003; Devas and Delay, 2006; Crawford 
and Hartmann, 2008).  As the findings presented in both this and the following section 
demonstrate, despite the policy and supports outlined in the previous section, each of these 
remains extremely limited or non-existent in the Burundian case.  
  
As Smoke (2003) outlines, the absence of a clear division of responsibilities between local 
and central government can equate to a lack of local government autonomy and discretionary 
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powers.  Moreover it can mean, on the one hand, that central authorities maintain a relatively 
high degree of control over local development priorities, or, on the other, that central 
authorities abdicate their responsibilities for local development altogether.  Either way in the 
absence of clarity over the division of responsibilities, confusion reigns over the roles and 
responsibilities of the different layers of administration, and accountability for key 
administrative functions remains blurred.  A number of researchers have already highlighted 
this problem within the Burundian context (ABELO, 2009; OAG, 2007, 2010) with the OAG 
(2010: 70) describing this as a ‘remarkable gap’ given its importance to the success of the 
process.  The findings from this research support this.  The problem was repeatedly raised by 
representatives of donor agencies interviewed while Administrators and officials within the 
communes investigated routinely responded to the question as to their core role and 
responsibilities with the response that everything that happened within the commune was 
their responsibility.  This is questionable given the presence of multiple state agencies and 
institutions at provincial level[13].  Moreover, the policing and judicial system, together with 
public sector wages (for teachers, healthcare staff etc...) are administered centrally while a 
primary school building project underway throughout the country is widely promoted as a 
project of the state President[14].  What the widespread assertion that commune officials ‘do 
everything’ does appear to indicate is that many issues are left to the Administrator and 
his/her team. However, it remains unclear which of these issues officially fall under their 
remit and which are the official responsibility of other state agencies.  While confusing and 
frustrating for all officials involved, this lack of clarity is also a concern in that it undermines 
any basis for public accountability with citizens remaining very unclear as to who is 
accountable for what.  
  
An allied issue is that of financial autonomy of local levels from the centre.  Articles 71 and 
77 of the Local Government Law refer to the necessity for a transfer of financial resources 
from the centre to communes (Gouvernement de Burundi, 2005). As other researchers and 
commentators have noted – and as repeatedly pointed out by national level stakeholders in 
interviews – this has not yet happened in Burundi.  In the absence of a transfer of resources 
from the central budget, local communes rely on two principle sources for their 
13 | P a g e  
 
budgets.  First, revenue is raised through local taxation.  Given the significant disparities in 
wealth between different communes and indeed different provinces, revenues raised in this 
manner differ greatly.  For example, figures collated by ABELO relating to the years 2006 
and 2007 show a mean income of US$ 50,088 and US$ 57,664 for these years respectively 
with huge disparities between communes (US$8,101 in one commune to US$ 1,767,483 in 
another (2006 figures) and US$ 9,321 in one commune to US$ 2,364,158 in another (2007 
figures)) (see ABELO, 2010: 52-54).  The second principle source of funds is donors and 
NGOs.  Both the EU’s Gutwara Neza and the World Bank’s PRADECS programmes provide 
funding for micro-projects in the areas of health, education and local 
infrastructure.  The PRADECS programme provides funding for projects up to US$ 100,000 
with approx. 3 per cent counterpart funding required.  1.5 per cent of this comes from local 
communities and between 0.5 and 2 per cent from commune budgets[15].  Communes can 
apply to an additional fund, the FONIC – a public investment fund, for their commune 
contribution or indeed for additional projects.  It remains somewhat unclear on what basis 
FONIC funds are allocated however[16] and the national Head of Decentralisation reports that 
this fund is now to be allocated on a ‘performance’ basis, although again the precise 
performance rating criteria remain to be elaborated[17].  Commune officials state that they 
apply for FONIC funds for particular projects but are unaware of the criteria on which their 
applications are judged or the basis on which funds are allocated.  Additionally, commune 
officials and Administrators seek funds from other international NGOs that may operate in 
their commune.  This, however, officials report, is necessarily on a somewhat ad hoc basis 
and projects funded are often determined by funders own priorities and interests rather than 
priorities set out in commune development plans. 
  
Evidently, as reported by other commentators heretofore and as noted by many interviewees, 
many communes are severely short of funds and much of the projects and activities set out in 
commune development plans remain unaddressed.  A strong case can certainly be made, as it 
has been by ABELO (2010) and others, for a devolution of funds from central to local level 
as set out in the Law of 2005.  However, in this regard it is worth a reminder that studies 
elsewhere show that a devolution of funds with insufficient or ineffective public 
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accountability and transparency mechanisms can result in exacerbated local tensions and 
conflicts (Conyers, 2007; UNDP, 2009).  In this respect it is noteworthy that all commune 
council members interviewed professed to being unaware and uninformed as to how priorities 
in budget expenditure are determined within their commune currently.  The provisions of the 
legislative and policy framework notwithstanding, there remains therefore an absence of 
clarity and transparency in respect of both administrative accountability and decision-making 
in relation to resource allocation. 
  
This brings us to the third related issue of downward accountability.  As noted in Section 3.1, 
commune councils are obliged to display both the content of deliberations and details of 
decisions reached at council meetings on public notice boards outside the council offices.  Of 
the eight commune offices visited, just two had any relevant information posted on their 
notice boards.  One had posted a notice (in French which is not widely spoken) of an 
upcoming meeting, while the other had, in line with the procedures set out, posted a record of 
deliberations and decisions taken from their last meeting.  None of the eight communes 
visited had disseminated information on their annual budgets and none had carried out the 
required public consultations, with the exception of specific public meetings organised and 
attended by the Administrator alone to collect revenue for specific projects.  This pattern is 
mirrored again at hill level where, of the 22 hill councils examined, council committee 
meetings, as set out in Article 37 of the Local Government Law, were reported to be sporadic 
and no hill councils had held public meetings (as set out in Article 35) with, once again, the 
exception being meetings held to collect revenue and organise community work for specific 
projects.  
  
The evidence reveals a lack of downward accountability therefore, suggesting that local 
officials remain unaware of the changes needed to traditional administrative and political 
practices as set out in the original policy.  Yet, paradoxically, commune council officials 
interviewed demonstrated a high level of awareness of their responsibilities in this 
regard.  Indeed, discussing what they had learned from the many workshops attended, all 
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interviewed emphasised the importance of downward accountability.  This is apparent from 
statements such as “the commune serves the population” [18]; “what we do comes from them 
[the people]” [19]; “decentralisation is a process giving people a voice” [20]; “we must work 
for the people” [21]; “our role is to go with the people’s needs” [22]. Despite this awareness 
however, local government accountability remains low.  Given the relatively high level of 
local officials’ awareness and understanding of the principle tenets of accountability to their 
citizens, the question remains as to why there is little or none in evidence.  
  
Drawing from interviews with officials exploring their motivations and deeper 
understandings of their role, two principal reasons for this policy-practice gap are 
proposed.  First, the continued partisanship of the local election process whereby candidates 
are elected in a block from party lists rather than individually reinforces traditional upward 
accountability and loyalty.  As others have pointed out (Ahamad et al, 2005, Yilmiz et al, 
2010), such arrangements leave local candidates more concerned with their promotion and 
advancement within internal party structures than in promoting policies and initiatives that 
benefit the local community at large.  Although executive positions in Burundi’s local 
communes are full-time, all Administrators interviewed revealed that they had held better 
paid positions in the past but admitted accepting their current post with an eye to their 
political futures.  As one Administrator noted[23], he has been nominated by Presidential 
decree (albeit having been selected by his commune council).  This brings officials – 
Administrators and council members alike – to the attention of senior party officials and there 
can be no doubt that council membership represents a strategic political move as much as 
anything else.  In a system where, historically, material gains have depended on strategic 
political alignment, such a rationale makes perfect sense. 
  
The second explanation for this policy-practice gap is the legacy of old hierarchies and the 
persistence of cultures and practices of upward accountability.  At commune level, despite 
the provisions set out in various legislative and policy texts, the Administrator continues to 
report to the commune council and the provincial Governor, but not the local 
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community.  The annual budget, once adopted by the commune council, is transmitted to the 
Governor for approval.  This is despite the fact that a significant proportion of the revenue 
(both financial and in terms of collective community works/counterpart funding) for this 
budget comes from local citizens. Hill council members, when defining their role, repeatedly 
used the phrase “the eyes and ears of the Administrator” - a characterisation suggesting more 
of a surveillance / control role as in the past than a role as a conduit for the views and 
proposals of local residents, as set out in current texts and policy.  Indeed, each Monday 
morning, in all communes, hill council leaders come together to meet with the Administrator 
and report on security and development issues on their hills.  This meeting is described by 
hill council leaders as a reporting structure rather than an opportunity to put forward 
proposals or suggestions[24].  Reinforcing this, both commune and hill council members, 
when asked to describe what is meant by the concept of community participation, 
consistently describe it in terms of revenue collection and/or brick building or other organised 
community works rather than in terms of citizen voice and influence as set out in the official 
texts.  Thus, for commune and hill level leaders alike, citizens continue to be viewed as 
subjects of the state – to be called on for material and financial supports for developmental 
activities decided upon elsewhere – rather than the active citizens envisaged within the 
decentralisation laws and policy. 
  
5. Decentralisation in practice: Public engagement 
As noted above, the fourth key requirement for decentralisation to work effectively is for an 
active citizen engagement and participation. As we have seen in Section 3, Burundi’s 
decentralisation policy is clear and unambiguous in this regard, according citizens a central 
role in decision-making and choice in relation to development initiatives and service 
provision in their localities.  Yet, mirroring the findings reported above, public engagement in 
practice remains extremely low.  None of the 162 hill residents involved in the research have 
ever attended a commune council meeting.  Indeed, just 12 per cent of residents professed to 
any knowledge as to what the commune council does – and this was a rather vague response 
in the areas of development and the maintenance of peace and order.  There is a clear gender 
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divide in terms of both knowledge of the council’s role and activities and in terms of access 
to the council members and/or the Administrator (whose role is slightly better known).  There 
is also a rural/urban divide in this regard.  Thus, of the 162 hill residents involved in the 
research, more men (four) than women (one – consulting a female Administrator) have 
consulted with their Administrator over particular matters and each of these live in or in the 
vicinity of the commune centre.  For many others, in the words of one resident, “it [the 
commune council] is for people at a higher level”[25], and many noted that it is not possible to 
personally access commune council members as only heads of the hill council can do this.  
  
However, as Uvin (2008, 2009) in particular has highlighted, the hill councils – five member 
councils elected as individual rather than party candidates for the first time in 2010 – 
represent a real opportunity for citizen participation in local economic and social 
affairs.  Among the hill residents participating in this research, there is a much greater 
awareness of the existence and the role of local hill councils.  Most respondents are aware of 
who their council representatives are.  Eighty per cent of respondents (two-thirds male, one 
third female) identified a role for the council.  It is important to note however that the role 
identified – arbitration and resolution of local conflicts – represents just one of the four roles 
envisaged within the local government law and neither residents themselves nor hill council 
members made any reference to a role in proposing activities to the commune council or 
monitoring local developmental activities. 
  
Although local conflict resolution was identified as the main role of the hill council by 80 per cent of 
respondents, only six out of the 162 residents consulted (four male, two female) stated that they have 
gone to their hill council with issues to be resolved (the issues were disputes with neighbours over 
land boundaries (three male); theft in the home (one male, one female); and family disputes arising 
from the widespread practice of ‘polygamy[26]’ (one female)).  For those that have not approached 
their hill council, when asked why not, some noted that they have not yet had issues which needed 
resolution, while others (predominantly women) pointed out that the issues they face are of no 
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interest to (predominantly male) council members.  For others, a sense of resignation with the hand 
they are dealt is palpable.  As one (female) respondent notes “everything is God’s word/will”[27].  
  
The overall picture therefore, is one of an extremely low level of citizen participation, either at 
commune or hill level.  Again, drawing from discussions with hill residents, the principal reason for 
this points to continuities with the past and the widespread view that nothing has changed in relation 
to how politics is conducted and how the system operates.  Three key findings support this 
argument. First, the qualities sought by hill residents in their elected leaders; second, the ongoing 
systematic exclusion (by both state officials and local residents themselves) of certain groups and 
individuals from political engagement; and third, the widespread distaste for politics which is 
associated with intimidation, insecurity and conflict. 
  
In relation to the first point, in terms of the qualities sought (and voted for) in an effective hill 
council member, there is remarkable consensus across all research sites, and between women 
and men.  Across all sample areas, people identified local ‘notables’ / people who are well 
known with integrity, an ability to listen, a sense of fairness, and a ‘bon 
comportement’.  Repeatedly respondents noted that a good track record as an effective 
community leader is important. These findings indicate that, while election of hill council 
members is a relatively new phenomenon, the people elected are not necessarily new to the 
role of community leaders.  It may therefore be difficult for new entrants to gain a foothold in 
this new institution (most notably women who have not enjoyed political prestige or 
leadership roles at a local level in the past and who face formidable obstacles in attempting to 
enter what is widely seen as a male arena).  It may also mean that these fora are captured by 
local elites.  Moreover, despite this introduction of a new local institution, continuities with 
the past in terms of relations with commune authorities are extremely apparent as evidenced 
in both the weekly reporting to the Administrator and in hill council members self 
characterisation as “the eyes and ears of the Administrator on the hill”, a characterisation 
more redolent of surveillance structures from the past rather than the representative structures 
set out in current policy and legislation.  
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A second, related point is the fact that a significant proportion of the population have been – 
and continue to be – repeatedly and systematically excluded from political life.  Specific 
groups in this regard include most women and the Batwa minority group, although many 
others have also been systematically excluded from active engagement in public 
life.  Moreover, this exclusion is actively exercised not exclusively by formal political 
authorities but, most strikingly, by communities, neighbours, individuals and family members 
themselves[28].  
  
The third critical point is the fact that the egregious abuse of power by political authorities in 
the past coupled with current politically motivated insecurity and violence (see Human Rights 
Watch, 2009, 2010; Sentamba, 2010, Uvin, 2010 and Vandeginste, 2011) has resulted in a 
widespread distaste for and disaffection from politics among ordinary citizens across the 
communes visited (and reportedly, more broadly).  Politics is popularly viewed as the 
principle source of insecurity and conflict.  Citizens are tired of violence, insecurity and 
unrest and, when asked about their views on politics and the role of political leaders, many, 
recalling the intimidation surrounding the 2010 elections coupled with ongoing reports of 
politically motivated violence, express the wish to be just left alone – wanting nothing to do 
with politics or politicians, including local commune structures.  
  
6. Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations 
While the findings might seem to indicate that, despite considerable financial investment, 
little has changed since the re-introduction of decentralisation in Burundi in 2005, it is 
important to remember that decentralisation is a process rather than a product and, as such, 
takes time.  Indeed, according to one view (OECD, 2004), it takes well over ten years to reap 
tangible benefits for local communities and this happens only when accompanied by 
significant political investments from state and civic actors alike.  The analysis presented 
above demonstrates that Burundi has a strong legislative and policy framework in 
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place.  However, this framework alone is insufficient.  Moreover, the findings demonstrate 
that a restricted emphasis on technical capacity building among local elites and their 
institutions alone carry several real risks to the stability of the process and to the country 
more broadly.   
 
Specifically, the historicised, political economy approach employed in this study reveals 
three principle constraints to an effective, transformative evolution of the process moving 
forward.  First, there is evidence that the predatory, neo-patrimonial state of the past lives on 
and may indeed extend its power through the process.  The state continues to be viewed – by 
officials and citizens alike – as the principle source of wealth, status and prestige in society.  
This is evidenced, inter alia, in the motivations of commune administrators and officials 
within their posts; in the selection criteria employed for citizen involvement in capacity 
building workshops; and in the lack of transparency and downward accountability in relation 
to decision-making on resource allocations.  In this context, the implicit assumption that state 
officials work for the common good and that all that is required is some capacity building in 
relation to administrative and financial procedures for the process to succeed needs to be re-
visited.  Moreover, with the newly elected hill councils functioning as the self-professed 
“eyes and ears of the administrator on the hills”, overseeing, reporting on and controlling 
rather than responding to residents’ views and actions, and with citizen participation reduced 
to revenue generation and community works for pre-defined activities, decentralisation, in its 
current guise, risks consolidating an extension of this predatory state into each hill and 
community across the country.  Second, the differential access afforded citizens to key 
officials reinforces the traditional hierarchies and patron-client relations of the past.  As we 
have seen, typically only the well connected (male, urban and non-Batwa) gain access to the 
corridors of power and influence at both hill, but particularly at commune level.  Combining 
this with the lack of public meetings and the dearth of mechanisms for downward 
transparency and accountability, the radical changes in political culture envisaged within the 
decentralisation policy remain distant and the risks of increasing political and horizontal 
inequalities grow.  And third, widespread public apathy toward and distaste for politics, as 
articulated by citizens across all research sites, means that the appetite for citizen 
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participation within these structures, even if the opportunities for such participation exist, is 
weak.   
 
The key lesson from all of this is that a focus on formal institutions alone is insufficient.  It is 
important not to confuse means with ends.  As the architects of the process envisaged at the 
outset, Burundi’s decentralisation process is about creating institutions as a means toward an 
even more ambitious end – the transformation of political culture and the promotion of local 
democracy and inclusive governance.  Thus, institutions need to be accountable, responsive 
and inclusive.  For both scholars and policy makers alike, this problematises the tendency 
within recent development and state-building literature to separate institutions from society 
and to largely ignore the place of citizens within these.  While much policy-relevant research 
on decentralisation in post-conflict contexts focuses on the sequencing of reforms (see for 
example Treisman, 2000; Lake and Rothchild, 2005; Schou and Haug, 2005; Siegle and 
O’Mahoney, 2008), it is often very unclear where citizens are located within these schema or 
indeed if they have a place at all.  While concerns about legitimacy are rightly raised, the 
literature has little to say about how such legitimacy might be built.  In highlighting the 
significant constraints to a successful roll-out of the process in Burundi, this study draws 
attention to the obstacles to citizen engagement and highlights the importance of supports 
which aim at bringing citizens back in.  Bringing citizens back in and shifting the focus of 
support from institution-building per se to institution-building which is more inclusive, 
responsive and accountable will go some way toward building the trust, confidence and 
legitimacy highlighted by proponents of decentralisation, hopefully paving the way for 
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[1] This research was carried out in association with Trócaire-Burundi.  The overall aim was to identify 
opportunities for citizen engagement in local structures and to make recommendations to Trócaire-Burundi’s 
local NGO partners for support to this.  The full research report is available at http://doras.dcu.ie/16691/.  
 Fieldwork was carried out in January, August and September of 2011 and consisted of both individual 
interviews (9 at national level, 4 within communes and 27 at hill level) and focus groups (16) at hill level 
(gender disaggregated and each comprising between 6 and 10 people).  
[2] National and commune level political institutional quotas are 60% (Hutu); 40% (Tutsi) with three places 
reserved in the national assembly and in the Senate for the ethnic minority Batwa. 
[3] There is a 30% quota for female representation in national and commune level institutions. 
[4] Burundi is made up of 17 provinces, subdivided into communes (129 in total) which, in turn, are subdivided 
into ‘collines’ or hills (2,910 in total). 
[5] Rwanda and Burundi share a similar colonial heritage and ethnic composition. 
[6] All translations of articles, legislative texts and interview transcripts are my own. 
[7] Interview with Elias Sentamba, August 19th. 
[8] Commune councils are made up of 15 elected members (of which at least five are women) and hill councils 
are made up of five members. 
[9] Interview Eric Charvet, EU Mission in Burundi, August 10th. See also http://www.gutwaraneza.bi/ 
[10] All Articles cited refer to Articles from the Local Government Law (Gouvernement de Burundi, 2005). 
[11] The principle international agencies involved in capacity building training are the World Bank (through 
its PRADECS programme), the EU (through its Gutwara Neza programme), and Co-Operation Suisse which 
provides an intensive support to the process in Ngozi province in the north of the country.  A wide range of local 
NGOs – some contracted by international agencies – have carried out training also. 
[12] Interview Eric Charvet, EU Mission in Burundi, August 10th. 
[13] For example, each province has offices of health, education, agriculture and livestock development. 
[14] This emanates from an electoral promise.  A building programme is underway with the aim being to furnish 
all hills with a primary school. Local communities provide bricks and labour and ‘the President’ provides the 
corrugated roofing, windows and the mason’s wages. 
[15] Interview Thomas Minani, Executive Secretary PRADECS, August 11th. 
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[16] It proved impossible to get documentation in this regard and a number of requests for an interview with the 
Head of FONIC were denied. 
[17] Interview Théophile Niyonsaba, Head of Decentralisation in the Ministry of Home Affairs, August 9 th. 
[18] Interview Administrator, August 17th. 
[19] Interview Administrator, August 22nd. 
[20] Interview Administrator, August, 25th. 
[21] Interview Administrator, August 30th. 
[22] Interview Administrator, September 1st. 
[23] Interview Administrator August 22nd. 
[24] Interviews Hill council leaders August 18th, 22nd and 31st. 
[25] Interview resident Rugombo commune, Cibitoke province, September 2nd. 
[26] ‘Le concubinage’ or ‘la polygamie’ refers to the widespread practice of husbands deserting their wives for 
another woman.  This practice was repeatedly raised by women (and a small number of men) as the biggest 
problem they face.  As well as leaving women in an economically fragile position, this practice also leaves them 
vulnerable to physical and sexual assault and is the cause of many local conflicts. 
[27] Interview resident Mugongo Manga commune, Bujumbura Rurale province, August 26th. 
[28] For example, on hills where there are no female hill council members, the suggestion put to female focus 
groups that the election of a female candidate might increase the likelihood that some of the issues raised by the 
groups might be taken more seriously by their hill council was met with some incredulity and amusement.  The 
phrase repeatedly used was “politics – that’s men’s business”. 
 
